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The NCAA is commonly viewed as a cartel. We model the cartel relationship between the
member teams and the NCAA central organization as a principal-agent relationship. Our model
predicts imperfect agency behavior on the part of the NCAA with corresponding overregula-
tion relative to the level preferred by the member teams. We empirically test the model by
examining the impact of the 1984 Supreme Court decision that reassigned the telecast rights
for intercollegiate football from the NCAA to the individual member teams. Our empirical
estimates of telecasts, attendance, and competitive balance support the prediction of imperfect
agency behavior by the NCAA.
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1 Introduction
The NCAA is most commonly viewed as a cartel [see, for example, Koch (1983; 1986); Pacey (1985);
Lawrence (1987); Fleisher et al (1992); and Mackey (1995).] The cartel view of the NCAA posits
a group of individual competitors held together through rules and regulations administered by the
NCAA central organization as a facilitating device for cartel behavior. One implicit assumption is
that in the absence of the NCAA structure the intercollegiate athletic industry would operate more
competitively and e±ciently, producing a greater level of output (games) at a lower price in each
sport.1 The cartel model, by proposing a uni¯ed group in which the NCAA central organization
acts as a facilitator of member school interests, also implicitly assumes perfect agency behavior on
the part of the NCAA central organization.
¤Presented at the Western Economic Association International Conference July 4-8, 2001, San Francisco, California
1We understand that the inherent nature of an athletic event as a joint product of competitors requires some
minimal structure to ensure a viable product, such as ensuring availability of competitors for any one team. By
"NCAA structure" here we mean rules and regulations beyond this minimally required level.
1Some alternative views of the NCAA can be found in the literature. Zimbalist (1999) points
out that although the NCAA operates like a cartel in some respects, this view cannot fully explain
all aspects of the behavior of the NCAA. Koch (1983, 1986) proposed that the NCAA operates
as a separate central organization that has di®erent interests than do the member universities.
He stated that the primary concern of the NCAA central organization is its own power, size and
permanence (1986, p. 331). In this paper we explore the implications of the views of Zimbalist
and Koch. If the NCAA central organization has objectives of its own that di®er from those of the
university members, does the pursuance of these alternative objectives a®ect NCAA policies and
regulations? If such behavior exists, does it mitigate or exacerbate any cartel e®ects?
The suit brought against the NCAA by two members of the cartel, the Universities of Oklahoma
and Georgia, contested the NCAA's regulations of college football telecasts. This legal action by
cartel member teams suggests imperfect agency behavior by the NCAA. In this paper we examine
this issue in view of the 1984 Supreme Court decision in this suit that disallowed the NCAA control
over the negotiating rights to televising college football games.2 The NCAA's primary line of defense
to this suit was that the telecast regulations were necessary to protect live game attendance and to
maintain competitive balance across teams so as to ensure fan interest, both considered important
to member team interests. The literature evaluating the impact of this decision contains con°icting
evidence on the nature of the relationships between football telecasts and attendance, and telecasts
and competitive balance among teams.
We explore these issues by modeling the relationship between member colleges and the NCAA
central organization as a principal-agent relationship. This approach is complementary to the
cartel view of the NCAA. The NCAA may be viewed as a regulatory organization with respect to
intercollegiate sports and operates essentially as a monopoly in this role.3 Although it is a regulator,
NCAA regulations ostensibly promote the interests of the member teams. We model the individual
member teams as principals: The member teams authorize the NCAA central organization as
their agent to develop and enforce regulations that will make them better o® than if they acted
independently. As in any principal-agent relationship, each party has its own objective(s). The
degree to which the objectives of the principal are achieved depends on the degree to which the
agent's objectives diverge from those of the principal.
The 1984 Supreme Court decision presents a unique opportunity to examine the agency be-
havior of the NCAA's central organization. This decision e®ectively altered the rights structure in
negotiating football television contracts by reducing those rights for the NCAA central organiza-
tion and increasing the rights of the member colleges. If the NCAA had acted as a perfect agent
then its regulation of football telecasts and contracts would have maximized the objectives of the
member team-principals. If, on the other hand, the NCAA had acted as an imperfect agent, then
its regulations would have promoted its own objectives rather than those of the member teams,
and the teams would be better o® as a result of the Supreme Court decision.
Our ¯ndings indicate that although the Supreme Court decision increased the total number of
televised football games, it had essentially no impact on either live game attendance or competitive
balance. The estimated impact of the decision on attendance is negative but not statistically
signi¯cant over all Division I teams as well as for \power" teams and \non-power" teams examined
separately. We de¯ne \power teams" as those that appeared on national television four or more
times from 1978-1983. The \power teams' in the sample are listed on Table 1. The estimated
impact of the decision on competitive balance is mixed, although overall there was essentially no
2National Collegiate Athletic Association v. U.S. v. Board of Regents 468 US 85, 120 (1984).
3The National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) performs functions similar to those of the NCAA.
However, the NAIA primarily deals with small schools which are not involved in major intercollegiate athletic events
such as those in NCAA a±liated schools.
2Table 1: \Power" Schools
Alabama Michigan San Diego St.
Arkansas Navy Southern California
Army Nebraska Stanford
Florida Notre Dame Texas
Florida St. Ohio St. Texas A&M
Georgia Oklahoma Tulane
Georgia Tech Penn St. UCLA
Miami Pittsburgh Washington
signi¯cant change following the decision. We employed various measures of competitive balance,
and applied these both within conferences and across all Division I teams. An additional ¯nding
is that the characteristics of the teams more likely to appear on TV following the Supreme Court
decision di®ered from those characteristics that applied under the NCAA regulatory regime. Our
¯ndings on team characteristics as well as on attendance and overall competitive balance support
the prediction of imperfect agency behavior by the NCAA.
2 A principal-agent model of the NCAA
A representative member college principal
A member institution obtains bene¯ts from the way in which a quantity x of NCAA regulation
improves its revenues (TR) and reputation (REP). A member college also incurs costs associated
with NCAA regulations. These costs are the opportunity cost, c, associated with the payment to
the NCAA, which is the member college's share of revenues contributed to the NCAA, s(TR), and
the constraints that each institution faces as a result of the regulations.
Let the bene¯ts, b, to a member college principal from any level x of the relevant NCAA
regulation be de¯ned so that TR(x) = b1(x) and REP(x) = b2(x). Similarly, the opportunity cost
to the member college principal of any level of the relevant NCAA regulation be de¯ned as c(x).
The member college principal's utility function associated with an NCAA regulation may therefore
be stated as
UP = TR(x) + REP(x) ¡ c(x) ¡ s[TR(x)];
so that
UP = b1(x) + b2(x) ¡ c(x) ¡ s[b1(x)]: (1)
The NCAA central organization agent
Our behavioral model of the NCAA central organization proposes that it obtains bene¯ts from two
sources: income or revenues of the organization and the prestige and authority of the NCAA in the
¯eld of intercollegiate athletics. 4 Higher income to the NCAA central organization provides greater
4We understand that, as with any organization, the NCAA central organization is a collection of individuals whose
role is to design, implement, and enforce the regulations as put forth by the organization as a whole. The behavior
which we attribute here to the central organization re°ects the likely administrative behavior of the individual(s) who
3discretionary ability for NCAA managers, particularly given that its nonpro¯t status precludes
monitoring of managers in the form and to the degree that would occur through the evaluation of
pro¯tability in capital markets. Because pro¯t is not explicitly measured or accounted for, costs
and expenditures may increase with managerial discretion as revenues increase. The NCAA's role
as regulator and monitor of intercollegiate programs is important to the coordination and e®ective
operation of the athletic programs. The NCAA central organization is dependent upon these
programs for its own revenues. We incorporate this into our behavioral model as the NCAA's share
of revenue, s, it receives from any member school, s(TR).
Prestige and authority re°ect the NCAA central organization's power and ability to exert control
over the individual athletic programs. As stated earlier, the NCAA's regulation of these programs
is important to their e®ective operation. The NCAA as producer of these regulations also places
the organization's management in a clear position of authority and generates a high pro¯le and
signi¯cant prestige in the sports community and beyond. Our model incorporates the relationship
of NCAA's prestige and authority to the NCAA's role as regulator through the inclusion of the
variable (AUTH).
The NCAA's decision on the form and implementation of any particular regulation x is made
with these potential bene¯ts in mind. Therefore, from the NCAA's decision vantage point, income
and authority each depend on x.
Let the bene¯ts, b, to the NCAA from any level x of the relevant NCAA regulation be de¯ned
so that s[TR(x)] = s[b1(x)] and AUTH(x) = b3(x). The NCAA agent's utility function associated
with an NCAA regulation may therefore be stated as
UA = s[TR(x)] + AUTH(x);
so that
UA = s[b1(x)] + b3(x): (2)
Welfare maximization with perfect and imperfect agency behavior
Maximizing social welfare in this framework maximizes the joint welfare of the principal and agent.
We show ¯rst the outcome with perfect agent behavior as a benchmark for e±ciency in the level
of regulations.
Perfect agent behavior
With perfect agency, b3(x) = 0, so that the agent seeks to maximize the utility of the principal plus
its own income. The relevant social utility function is therefore
UA = UP + s[TR(x)] = UP + s[b1(x)]: (3)
The optimization problem may be stated as
max UP + s[b1(x)];
or
max b1(x) + b2(x) ¡ c(x) ¡ s[b1(x)] + s[b1(x)]:
are in authority at the NCAA and who are responsible for the decision to go forward with any particular regulatory
design or implementation and enforcement procedure.
4Let b1(x) + b2(x) = B(x). The revenue payment from the school to the agent nets out, so that
the optimization problem with perfect agency behavior becomes
max [b1(x) + b2(x) ¡ c(x)] = max [B(x) ¡ c(x)]: (4)
The ¯rst order condition for a maximum is
b0
1(x) + b0
2(x) ¡ c0(x) = 0;





B0(x) = c0(x): (5)
The optimal level of regulation, x¤, is shown in Figure 1.
Imperfect agent behavior
With imperfect agency, the agent seeks to maximize its own utility, which, while related to as the
objective of the principal (through the revenue e®ect) is distinct from the utility of the principal.
The relevant social utility function therefore becomes the combined utility functions of the member
principal and the NCAA agent:
UP + UA = b1(x) + b2(x) ¡ c(x) ¡ s[b1(x)] + b3(x) + s[b1(x)]: (6)
The imperfect agency optimization problem may be stated as
max b1(x) + b2(x) ¡ c(x) ¡ s[b1(x)] + b3(x) + s[b1(x)];
or
max B(x) ¡ c(x) ¡ s[b1(x)] + b3(x) + s[b1(x)]; (7)
where B(x) = b1(x) + b2(x) as before. The revenue payment from the school to the agent again
nets out, so that the optimization problem with perfect agency behavior becomes
max [B(x) + b3(x) ¡ c(x)]:
The ¯rst order condition for a maximum is
B0(x) + b0
3(x) = c0(x): (8)
The level of regulation with imperfect NCAA agency behavior is shown in Figure 1 as xI > x¤.
The e®ect of imperfect NCAA behavior is that the level of regulation designed and implemented
by the NCAA is greater that which is optimal for the member college principals even given the
requisite sharing of revenue with the NCAA. The implication of this in a cartel setting is that,
to the extent that NCAA regulations adversely a®ect choices by individual member principals,
these choices are more highly constrained than is optimal. The NCAA regulations on televising
intercollegiate football constrained the number of appearances in total and of any given member
school (the number of telecast games available to fans, or consumers of intercollegiate football)
which can a®ect member team revenues and reputation from increased visibility on television. This















alters the cartel outcome as well. If a member college participates in the NCAA to obtain a share
of cartel bene¯ts, imperfect NCAA agency behavior has the e®ect of reducing those bene¯ts below
the expected cartel outcome by restricting total output of telecasts and telecasts of games for any
particular member team further than would be predicted in a cartel with perfect agency behavior.
The telecast regulations reduce surplus bene¯ts and redistribute these bene¯ts from member teams
to the NCAA central organization decision makers.
In their analysis of the 1984 Supreme Court decision, Pacey (1985) and Greenspan (1988)
¯nd that the response of the colleges to this decision resulted in a larger number of televised
games and increased bene¯ts to consumers of football games. Other e®ects are less clear. They
suggest that this response to the decision resulted in decreased football related revenues to many
NCAA member teams, advertisers, television networks and syndicators, and redistributed resources
among the NCAA member teams. Pacey's analysis relies on legal briefs rather than speci¯c data.
Greenspan's conclusions are based on highly aggregated data, such as annual total football revenue
and attendance.
Predicted e®ects of NCAA imperfect agency behavior on live game attendance and bene¯ts
in terms of recruiting and other factors that may a®ect reputation are also unclear. If televised
games are a substitute for live game attendance, as Lawrence (1987) and Fizel and Bennett (1989)
suggest, then the 1984 decision could result in lower live game attendance as the number of tele-
vised games increases. Such an outcome would be evidence suggested that the NCAA telecast
regulations re°ected perfect agency behavior by promoting interests of the member team principals
through promoting increased attendance. If, however, televised games and live game attendance are
complementary, as the Kaempfer and Pacey (1986) study suggests, then the 1984 decision would
promote live game attendance. This outcome, or an outcome where attendance is una®ected by
the decision indicating no relationship between telecasts and attendance, would provide support
for the hypothesis that the NCAA's television regulations re°ected imperfect agency behavior by
not promoting the interests of the member principals.
The other primary line of defense by the NCAA was equalization of competition among member
teams. The motivation for this is that equalization of competition would result in more interesting
athletic events, thus stimulating fan interest and making the member teams better o®. There is
some controversy with respect to the e®ect of the 1984 decision on competitive balance. Koch
(1986) stated that the decision "accentuated the existing inequality among the various" colleges (p.
329). Greenspan (1988), however, stated that the increase in the number of televised games for a
6larger number of teams following the removal of NCAA constraints could have an equalizing e®ect
on the relative competitiveness of teams. This would occur because increased television exposure
for more teams would generate a corresponding increased interest of potential recruits so that better
players may be more evenly spread across all member colleges. If Koch's view is correct, then the
NCAA telecast regulations would have re°ected perfect agency behavior by promoting the interest
of the member team principals. Competitive balance would be reduced following the 1984 decision.
If Greenspan's view is correct, then the e®ect of the NCAA telecast regulations would have re°ected




Our data come from the college football seasons from 1977 through 1991. We focus only on Division
I-A football, the NCAA classi¯cation composed of the largest intercollegiate football programs in
the country. The full sample consists of 137 institutions that played Division I college football in
1978. The full sample contains some teams, like the Ivy League schools, that are now in Division
I-AA but were Division I before this division was split into I-A and I-AA in 1980.
The vast majority of televised college football games were played between Division I schools
during this period. The sample period includes seven seasons before the 1984 Supreme Court
decision and seven years following the decision. We use this period because it contains an equal
number of seasons before and after the decision and also includes a period of relatively stable
conference composition in Division I. There were a number of important changes to the conference
structure in Division I in the period following the 1991 season, including the establishment of two
new major football conferences, the Big East and the Big XII, expansions of the Southeast and Big
10 conferences, and the demise of the Southwest Conference. We end the sample in 1991 to avoid
confusing the e®ects of the Supreme Court decision with the e®ects of these changes in conference
alignment within Division I. There were 8467 games played between Division 1 teams during this
period; 4094 were played from 1977 to 1983 and 3840 were played from 1985 to 1991.
The primary source of data on individual college football games is the comprehensive web
site developed by James Howell for the Usenet newsgroup rec.sport.football.college.5 This web site
contains an archive of the participating teams, date, location and ¯nal score of nearly every major
college football game ever played from the late 19th century on. Data on television broadcasts of
college football games were taken from various issues of the Report of the NCAA Football Telecast
Committee for the period 1978-1983 and from individual issues of USAToday for the period 1984-
1991.
The data on individual games were supplemented with season-speci¯c data on conference af-
¯liation, total home attendance, number of home games, coaching changes, conference standings,
post-season bowl appearances and ¯nal rankings in Polls. These data were primarily taken from
various issues of NCAA Football, an annual publication of the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion. Final Poll rankings were obtained from various issues of the New York Times and USAToday.
Finally, institution-speci¯c enrollment data were obtained from the Integrated Postsecondary
Educational Data (IPEDS) system, collected and published by the U.S. Department of Education's
National Center on Educational Statistics. The IPEDS Fall Enrollment survey contains detailed
information on enrollment at all U.S. institutions of higher education as of October of each academic
5http://www.cae.wisc.edu/ dwilson//rsfc/history/howell/
7year, the approximate midpoint of the college football season.
Telecasts
The 1984 Supreme Court decision radically changed the property rights to college football telecasts.
In the period 1977-1983, the NCAA determined how many football games would be broadcast,
which games were broadcast and which networks would be permitted to broadcast college football
games. In the post-decision period, schools and conferences were free to negotiate with networks,
and any network could televise college football games. Given the striking di®erences between the
pre- and post-decision environment, we ¯rst examined some basic sample statistics from our data
to illustrate how college football telecasts were a®ected by the decision.
We restrict our analysis to regular season television appearances on national television networks
or national cable stations like ESPN and TBS. Before 1984 there were a number of additional types
of over the air broadcasts and closed circuit telecasts of college football games limited to local
markets, but these appearances did not produce any appreciable revenues or exposure beyond local
areas. Broadcasts on networks or cable stations can be divided into two types: regional broadcasts
and national broadcasts. National broadcasts were carried by all local network a±liates in the
country. Regional broadcasts were carried by some subset of the local network a±liates. All
football games on cable stations are de¯ned as national broadcasts.
Figure 2 shows the number of television appearances by schools in our sample over the period
1978-1990. During the period of NCAA control of football broadcasts there were more regional
broadcasts than national broadcasts but during the post-1984 period the number of national broad-
casts increased relative to the number of regional broadcasts. The NCAA generally negotiated two-
year contracts with broadcasters. The contract periods in the sample were 1978-1979, 1980-1981
and 1982-1983. From this ¯gure, the NCAA was increasing the number of telecasts even before the
1984 decision, perhaps in response to the Board of Regents case which was ¯led on September 8,
1981. However, the almost threefold increase in the total number of telecasts after deregulation is
striking. This increase in the number of telecasts has been interpreted as a direct result of the loss
of cartel power by the NCAA following the 1984 Supreme Court decision.
There are two ways to look at the distribution of football telecasts in the sample: by team-
seasons and by teams. Table 2 shows the distribution of telecasts by team-season in the sample.
There are 137 teams and 13 seasons in the sample, giving a total of 1,781 team-seasons in the
sample. Note that the columns of Table 2 sum to 100%.
Table 2: Distribution of TV Appearances by Team-Season, 1978-1990
# of Appearances per season National TV Regional TV Total
0 67% 54% 43%
1 17% 23% 20%
2 8% 13% 13%
3 4% 5% 8%
4 2% 4% 6%
5 2% 1% 4%
6+ 1% 0% 6%
From Table 2, most teams in the sample had no TV appearances in an average season. National
broadcasts were also relatively rarer than regional broadcasts. It also appears that the majority
8Figure 2: TV Appearances By Year
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9of TV appearances in the sample were concentrated among a relatively small number of teams,
as only 36% of the teams in the sample had multiple TV appearances in a season. However, just
because the average team did not make a TV appearance in an average season in the sample does
not mean that most teams did not appear on TV during the sample period. Table 3 shows the
distribution of total TV appearances for the 137 schools in the sample over the entire sample period
and in the six years before and after the Supreme Court decision.
Table 3 shows the distribution of TV apeparances for all schools in the sample over the entire
1978-1990 period. Table 3 indicates that each team in the sample appeared on TV at least once
during the period 1978-1990. However, about one third of the schools appeared on TV ¯ve times or
fewer over this period, and between 10 and 15 percent only appeared once. At the other end of the
distribution, nearly half the s in the sample appeared 16 times or more, or more than once per year
on average. The pre- and post-1984 breakdown indicated that the majority of these appearances
came after 1984.
Table 3: Distribution of Total TV Appearances By School, 1978-1990
% of Teams in Sample
Total TV Appearances 1978-1990 1978-1983 1985-1990
0 0% 11% 11%
1 10% 15% 13%
2-5 23% 30% 20%
6-10 10% 18% 11%
11-15 9% 16% 8%
16+ 48% 3% 37%
Based on the distribution of telecasts shown on the tables above, the increase in the number
of telecasts after 1984 does not tell the entire story. Deregulation of college football telecasts also
changed the characteristics of the games that were televised. In order to further explore the impact
of deregulation on TV appearances, we analyzed the factors that explain which games appeared on
television before and after deregulation. To do this, we created a binary variable, TV Ai;t, which
takes the value of 1 if school i appeared on television in year t. We then estimated the parameters
of the following Logit model
TV Ai;t = °i+®1Wi;t¡1+®2RANK20i;t¡1+®3TVi;t¡1+®4BOWLi;t¡1+®5ENRi;t+®6EXPi;t¡1+ei;t (9)
using the sample data described above. W is the number of wins by team i in the previous season,
RANK20 is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if team i was ranked in the UPI or AP Top
20 in the previous season, TV is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if team i appeared on TV
in the previous season, ENR is total headcount enrollment in thousands at school i, BOWL is an
indicator variable that is equal to 1 if team i played in a bowl game in the previous season, EXP is
the number of years of head coaching experience of the football coach at school i, and e is an error
term that is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. Notice that
this speci¯cation includes a school-speci¯c e®ect on the probability of appearing on TV , gi. This
school-speci¯c e®ect captures unmeasured factors like reputation and prestige on the probability of
a school's football team appearing on television.
Table 4 shows the results of estimating Equation 9 for several di®erent subsamples and types
of telecasts. The estimated school-speci¯c e®ects are not reported but are available from the
10authors on request. These results show a clear di®erence in the characteristics of games that were
televised before and after 1984. Before 1984, television appearances in the previous season and
bowl appearances in the previous season were the most important factors a®ecting a television
appearance in the current season. Success in the previous season, as measured by the number of
regular season wins, had no e®ect on television appearances in the current period. Appearing on
television in the previous season reduced the probability of appearing on television in the following
year, holding the school-speci¯c e®ect constant. This re°ects the NCAA policy of distributing
television appearances widely across teams. Note that the results on Table 4 are robust to the
exclusion of the lagged dependent variable.
Table 4: Fixed-E®ects Logit Regressions
Total Appearances National Broadcasts Regional Broadcasts
Pre '84 Post '84 Pre '84 Post '84 Pre '84 Post '84
Wins Last Season -.015 .141* .096 .183* -.018 .058
(.069) (.071) (.091) (.068) (.069) (.066)
Top 20 Ranking Last Season -.151 -.802 -.173 .584 -.302 -.684
(.567) (.656) (.505) (.456) (.535) (.458)
TV Appearance Last Season -.800* -.518* -.218 -.120 -.810* -.680*
(.235) (.261) (.314) (.280) (.254) (.289)
Bowl Last Season 1.36* .004 .472 .115 1.44* .339
(.445) (.454) (.446) (.372) (.427) (.419)
Enrollment (000s) .002 -.126 .307* .121 .035 -.063
(.129) (.107) (.159) (.105) (.123) (.092)
Head Coachs Experience .023 .015 .090* .001 .025 .007
(.032) (.030) (.050) (.095) (.028) (.025)
N (Teams) 448(90) 387(65) 335(67) 471(79) 483(97) 455(76)
Standard Errors in Parentheses
*: Signi¯cant at 10% level
In the later period the primary determinant of a television appearance is success in the previous
year. Prior television appearances still reduce the probability of appearing on television in the
current season, but the marginal e®ect fell from -6% to -3.8%. The di®erence may be due to
network's preferences for games between successful teams in order to maximize the size of the
viewing audience.
There is also a di®erence in the determinants of regional telecasts and national telecasts. In the
pre-1984 period, national telecasts tended to involve colleges that are large in terms of enrollment,
and teams led by experienced coaches, a proxy for the reputation and stability of the football
program. The NCAA appears to have rewarded large and stable football programs with national
television appearances. In the later period, size and the experience of the head coach do not predict
national television appearances; only success in the previous season is a good predictor of television
appearances in the current season. For regional broadcasts, there is little di®erence in the two
periods, perhaps because many of the post-1984 regional broadcasts are syndicated broadcasts of
conference games that are not part of major network programming. The Atlantic Coast Conference
may be able to force a syndicated carrier to televise games between some of the weaker teams in the
league and a nationally recognized team like Florida State as part of the season package of games.
These estimated e®ects support the hypothesis of imperfect agency behavior on the part of the
NCAA. First, evidence shows that the total number of games telecast nationally increased following
the Supreme Court decision. This evidence is consistent with our model's prediction of a higher
level of regulation than is in the interest of member team principals. This would have the e®ect of
11restricting output below the level that maximizes net bene¯ts to the principals.
Second, the di®erence in characteristics of the teams most likely to appear on television before
and after the decision provide additional evidence of NCAA imperfect agency behavior. During
the period of NCAA regulation, the teams most likely to be included in the NCAA package o®ered
to the networks were those at larger schools and whose head coach had greater experience in that
position. Such teams were more likely to be well known and command higher TV audiences and
higher value as part of the package. In addition, teams which had appeared in previous seasons
were less likely to be included in the NCAA package. This created scarcity and increased the value
of these individual teams. Preceding season success had no statistical e®ect on the NCAA's choice
in the period of regulation prior to the Supreme Court decision.
Together, the signi¯cant determinants suggest that the NCAA's packaging strategy was one
that maximized revenue from the package. Because the price paid to each team for a telecast was
the same for each school, regardless of size, maximizing total package revenue maximizes revenue
for the NCAA, not for the individual teams. This outcome promotes NCAA central organization
interests by directly increasing revenues available to its management and also by expanding its role
of authority over member teams.
In contrast, following the 1984 decision, the primary indicator of individual team appearances
in any season was its (successful) record in the preceding season. This indicator would promote
audience size and TV ratings, increasing market value to the broadcaster for the individual team.
The post-decision characteristic of teams likely to be telecast thus indicates revenue maximization
for individual teams rather than for the NCAA. These di®erences in characteristics of telecast teams
before and after the decision suggest that NCAA's regulations were designed to promote its own
interests at the expense of the interests of the member team principals.
Competitive Balance
Did the 1984 Supreme Court decision a®ect competitive balance in college football? The issue is
important because competitive balance a®ects fan interest and thus demand for tickets and telecasts
which in turn a®ects revenue earned by the schools and the NCAA. Although this question has
been addressed by several previous studies, no clear consensus on the direction or signi¯cance of
this e®ect has emerged in the literature. The disagreements in the literature focus on three distinct
areas:
1. the direction of the impact of telecast deregulation on competitive balance;
2. the appropriate measure of competitive balance; and
3. the particular games that might have been a®ected by deregulation.
We address each area in turn.
Direction of the impact of telecast deregulation on competitive balance
The direction of the impact of telecast deregulation on competitive balance depends in part on the
level of competitive balance during the period of NCAA regulation of football telecasts before the
1984 decision. NCAA had argued that one purpose of the regulations was to promote equalization
of competition across teams. Koch's (1986) view would support this position and would predict
that the period of NCAA regulation should be one of relatively greater competitive balance than
would exist with deregulation following the decision.
12The other view, as presented by Pacey (1985) and Greenspan (1988), believes that the NCAA's
regulation of college football telecasts reduced competitive balance. The Supreme Court decision
suggests that a majority of the Court held this position. Our behavioral model supports this
view. Imperfect agency behavior would generate regulations to promote the NCAA's own interests
rather than the interests of the member team principals. In this situation our model predicts either
reduced competitive balance or no improvement in competitive balance in the period following the
decision.
Measuring competitive balance
The second disputed issue centers on the appropriate measure of competitive balance. Winning
percentage, de¯ned as the number of wins divided by the total number of games played by a
team over some period of time, is the most common indicator of competitive balance in sports.
One common measure of competitive balance, developed by Noll (1988) and Scully (1989) is the
variability of the distribution of the winning percentages of some group of sports teams over some
period of time. Other commonly used measures of competitive balance include average winning
percentages, Gini coe±cients calculated from winning percentages, and excess tail frequencies of
the winning percentage distribution. See Fort and Quirk (1995) and Schmidt and Berri (2001) for
a full discussion.
Bennett and Fizel (1995), Eckard (1998) and Humphreys (2002) have all pointed out a potential
problem with many commonly used measures of competitive balance: they do not re°ect year-to-
year changes in relative standings of teams. Both Bennett and Fizel (1995) and Eckard (1998) use
only conference winning percentages to measure competitive balance. Bennett and Fizel use the
ratio of the actual standard deviation of winning percentage to the idealized standard deviation for
each conference, as well as summary statistics for the top and bottom two teams in each conference
in each year to capture the e®ects of turnover in relative standings. They conclude that there
was in increase in competitive balance in conferences after 1984. Eckard proposed decomposing
the variance of conference winning percentages into a time and cumulative component. He also
calculated Hir¯ndahl-Hirschman Indexes (HHIs) of bowl game appearances, top 20 poll ¯nishes,
and conference championships. Eckard also concluded that competitive balance increased after
1984 within Division I-A conferences.
Within-conference and division-wide competitive balance
The third contested issue centers on the possibility of a di®erential impact of telecast deregulation
on games played within a conferences and those played outside conferences. Colleges belonging to a
football conference must play a predetermined number of games against other conference members
in an alternating, or "home-and-home," arrangement each year. These conference games typically
make up a majority of the 11 football games that NCAA regulations allow each team to play in
a season and the team's records in these games determine the conference champion. Teams also
play a smaller number of non-conference games each year. These games are arranged by contracts
between individual teams and may be scheduled years in advance. In general, the opponents and
location of conference games are outside the control of an individual institution while the opponents
and location of non-conference games are under the control of the institutions.
Carroll (1991) found evidence that competitive balance increased after telecast deregulation in
that the overall winning percentage of teams ranked in the top 20 in post-season football polls had
lower mean overall winning percentages after 1984 and unranked football teams had higher mean
overall winning percentages. Eckard (1998) and Bennett and Fizel (1995) argue that conference
13winning percentages better re°ect the e®ect of telecast deregulation on competitive balance than
non-conference or overall winning percentages. They posit that television networks a®ected the
non-conference schedules of some teams in the post-regulation period by requesting more games
between high-pro¯le "football powers" in order to increase the potential television market for games.
Measuring competitive balance using only conference games is problematic for several reasons.
First, conference a±liation played no role in the Board of Regents decision. The Supreme Court
ruling applied to all college football games, not just conference games, and the conference a±liation
of teams was never mentioned as an important issue. Why then should the impact of this decision
be judged only by its impact on conference games? Further, if non-conference schedules changed in
response to the decision, then those changes are, by de¯nition, part of the impact of the decision.
Any analysis that ignores these games misses some part of the impact of the decision.
Second, over the period 1977-1991, between 20% and 25% of all Division I-A football teams did
not belong to a football conference in any given season. Focusing on only conference games ignores
over 20% of the Division I-A college football games played during this period, a sizable portion of
the sample.
The quantitative analysis of competitive balance literature has focused exclusively on end-
of-season winning percentages or winning percentages over longer periods of time. However, the
outcome of individual games can also reveal important information about how competitive any game
was, and thus shed light on the level of competitive balance. At the level of an individual game,
the ¯nal margin of victory, the di®erence between the number of points scored by the winning team
and the number of points scored by the losing team, is one possible measure of the competitiveness
of a game. The smaller the ¯nal margin of victory, the more competitive the contest, other things
equal.
One way to test for an impact of telecast deregulation on competitive balance in Division I-A
college football is to examine the distribution of the ¯nal margin of victory in games before and
after the 1984 Supreme Court decision. If this decision had no impact on the competitiveness
of individual games, then the average margin of victory in games in the seven seasons before the
decision should be the same as the average margin of victory in games in the seven seasons following
the decision. If the NCAA's defense of its telecast regulations was well founded, then the average
margin of victory should increase following the decision. Formally, we test the null hypothesis
Ho : AMV077¡083 = AMV095¡091
against the alternative
Ha : AMV077¡083 < AMV095¡091
where AMV is the average margin of victory in all Division I-A college football games.
Table 5: t-Tests on Average Margin of Victory
Null Hypothesis: Average Margin of Victory '77-'83 = Average Margin of Victory '85-'91
Type of Game P-value N077¡083 N085¡090
All Games .017 4094 3841
All Non-conference Games .005 1440 1296
All Conference Games .906 1976 1945
14Table 5 shows the results of the hypothesis tests. The \All Games" category includes games
between Division I-A and I-AA teams, but the other two categories include only games between
teams that were in Division I-A each season in the sample period. Clearly, the margin of victory
in college football games was larger after the 1984 Supreme Court decision. The average margin
of victory was about 0.63 points larger in the post-1984 period. To the extent that closer games
are more competitive, the results on Table 4 suggest that the decision reduced competitive balance
in college football. The results from two-tailed hypothesis tests (Ha : AMV077¡083 6= AMV095¡091)
were similar.
However, the second two rows of Table 5 show that, as Eckard (1998) and Bennett and Fizel
(1995) suggested, the impact of the decision was di®erent for conference games and non-conference
games, although not in the direction they predicted. There was no di®erence in average margin
of victory in conference games, but non-conference games were less competitive on average in the
period following the 1984 decision. It is di±cult to rationalize this di®erence as due to the in°uence
of television networks on non-conference schedules, because more competitive games should draw
larger television audiences, other things equal, implying that television networks would prefer to
televise more competitive games.
The increase in average margin of victory overall suggests that there was some basis for the
NCAA's defense of its telecast regulations. As one indicator of competitive balance, this result
does not support the prediction of imperfect agency behavior.
Competitive balance can also be analyzed using overall winning percentages for teams over a
number of seasons. The most commonly used test of competitive balance using data by team and
season was ¯rst proposed by Noll (1988) and applied to the case of Major League Baseball by Scully
(1989). This measure of competitive balance is the standard deviation of the won-loss percentage
of the teams in a sports league or conference over some number of seasons. De¯ne WPCTit as the
winning percentage of team i in season t. WPCTit is the number of wins for team i in season t
divided by the number of games played in season t by team i. This measure of competitive balance








This measure of competitive balance also has an ideal value that depends on the number of
games played by teams in a sports league. The idealized value of this measure of competitive
balance, NSI, is the standard deviation of winning percentages if all teams were of equal playing
strength. The larger the di®erence between NS and NSI, the less the degree of competitive balance
over the period. NSI is 0.15 for teams with 11 game schedules, which is the approximate average
number of games played by Division I-A college football teams over the sample period.
There are 1,580 team-seasons in our sample of Division I-A college football teams over the period
1977-1991. 1,213 of these team-seasons consist of teams in conferences and 367 consist independent
teams. The overall competitive balance statistic for the sample is 0.23, well above the ideal value of
0.15. Table 5 shows the competitive balance statistics for the entire sample as well as for the eight
Division I-A football conferences that existed throughout the entire sample period, broken down
into the pre- and post-Supreme Court decision periods. The equality of the standard deviation of
winning percentages across these two periods can be tested using a variance ratio test which has
an F-distribution. The P-value column on Table 6 is on the hypothesis test
Ho : NS077¡083 = NS085¡091
Ha : NS077¡083 6= NS085¡091
15based on a standard variance ratio test.
The results on Table 6 show no di®erence in competitive balance, as measured by the standard
deviation of the winning percentage, before and after the 1984 decision, as the P-values suggest
that the null hypothesis is accepted in all cases. The results of one-tailed tests (Ha : NS077¡083 >
NS085¡091 or Ha : NS077¡083 < NS085¡091) are identical. The results are the same using either
conference winning percentages or overall winning percentages. Note that the standard deviations
for conference winning percentages cannot generally be compared across conferences because NSI
depends on the number of conference games and each conference does not play the same number
of games.
Table 6: Standard Deviations of Winning Percentage
Ho : NS077¡083 = NS085¡091
Total Winning Percentage Conference Winning Percentage
Group NS77¡83 NS85¡91 P-Value NS77¡83 NS85¡91 P-Value
All I-A Teams .237 .238 .86 - - -
I-A Conference Teams .235 .243 .47 .275 .277 .80
ACC .217 .247 .35 .269 .308 .33
Big 10 .232 .251 .52 .271 .281 .76
Big 8 .289 .224 .22 .314 .218 .41
MAC .228 .240 .67 .245 .259 .65
Paci¯c 10 .207 .235 .28 .228 .235 .80
Southeastern .225 .244 .28 .292 .313 .55
Southwest .233 .269 .48 .293 .278 .70
WAC .236 .243 .83 .273 .262 .75
Recall that NS does not re°ect changes in relative standings over time. This means that NS
for a conference where the same team ¯nished ¯rst in each year and NS for a conference where
a di®erent team ¯nished ¯rst in each year could be identical. If the 1984 Supreme Court decision
a®ected only the relative standings in each year, then this metric might not re°ect this type of
change.
Humphreys (2002) proposed an alternative measure of competitive balance, the Competitive
Balance Ratio (CBR) that can detect changes in relative standings. The CBR scales the standard
deviation of the winning percentage, which is essentially a measure of within-league variation in
winning percentage, by a team-speci¯c measure of variation in winning percentage. The CBR
expresses team-speci¯c variation as a fraction of league-speci¯c variation in winning percentage, so
this statistic varies between zero and one.
Table 7 shows Competitive Balance Ratios for all Division I teams and the eight Division I-A
football conferences in the sample. This table also shows the P-value on a hypothesis test with a
null hypothesis that the team-speci¯c variation in winning percentage, the numerator of the CBR,
is the same in the seven year periods before and after the Supreme Court decision. From Table 7,
the denominators of the CBRs for each conference are the same.
The results on Table 7 suggest that competitive balance was essentially unchanged across Di-
vision I, as shown in line 1. Competitive balance changed within some conferences after 1984 but
the direction of the change di®ers across conferences. A rise (fall) in the CBR indicates more
16Table 7: Competitive Balance Ratios
Group CBR77¡83 CBR85¡91 P-Value
All D-I Teams .72 .73 .86
Conferences:
ACC .59 .79 .16
Big 10 .63 .59 .35
Big 8 .51 .49 .34
MAC .73 .83 .16
Paci¯c 10 .50 .77 .00
Southeastern .74 .69 .10
Southwest .62 .67 .17
WAC .60 .67 .14
(less) turnover in relative standings, and thus more (less) competitive balance within a conference.
The CBR rose in ¯ve conferences and fell in three conferences. One rise (Paci¯c 10) and one fall
(Southeastern) is signi¯cant at the 10% level, although the remaining three increases in the CBR
(ACC, MAC, Southwest, and WAC) are nearly signi¯cant. Thus the changes in the Competitive
Balance Ratios in Table 6 suggest that competitive balance in the Southeastern conference was
reduced after 1984 and competitive balance increased in the Paci¯c 10, ACC, MAC, Southwest and
WAC. The di®erential impact on competitive balance may be due to di®erences in revenue sharing
procedures across conferences. These di®erences have been documented and analyzed by Brown
(1994).
Overall, the evidence on the impact of the Supreme Court decision on competitive balance in
college football is mixed. Based on evidence from the outcome of individual games, the decision
appears to have reduced competitive balance, as the average margin of victory in some games
increased signi¯cantly in the period after the decision. This result supports the NCAA position
of defense in the case and does not support imperfect agent behavior. Based on evidence from
¯nal winning percentages, competitive balance improved within some conferences and worsened in
others, although there is no evidence that the overall level of competitive balance changed across
all teams in Division I-A. The overall outcome based on winning percentage provides some support
for the prediction of imperfect agent behavior.
Attendance
The relationship between telecasts and attendance was debated extensively in the NCAA v. Board
of Regents of University of Oklahoma case. The NCAA argued that its regulation of football
telecasts was needed to protect the existing market for attendance at football games. The courts
rejected this idea, ¯nding no evidence to support it. Understanding the impact of the Supreme
Court decision on attendance at football games is important in any analysis of the impact of the
decision.
Two previous studies examined the relationship between attendance and television broadcasts
of college football before and after 1984. Kaempfer and Pacey (1986) found that telecasts and
attendance at games were complements, implying that attendance should increase as a result of
the increase in own-game telecasts. Fizel and Bennett (1989) found that although own-game
broadcasts and attendance were complements, the overall increase in football telecasts after 1984
17led to a decline in attendance after controlling for increases in own-game telecasts.
The basic approach in the literature has been to estimate an aggregate demand function for
attendance at college football games. As Kaempfer and Pacey (1986) point out, these aggregate
demand functions are additive functions of individual's demand functions for a given market, and
thus can be derived from the basic constrained utility maximization problem from consumer theory.
As with any empirically viable demand function, the explanatory variables capture the e®ect of
prices, the number of potential consumers, factors that a®ect the utility associated with attending
games, and substitute and complementary activities. The general form of the demand function we
use is
ATTi;t = ®Zi + ¯Xit + ÁCt + uit (11)
where ATTi;t is total attendance at college football games at institution i in season t, Zi is a
vector of variables re°ecting those factors that a®ect demand for tickets to college football games
at institution i that do not change over the sample period, X is a vector of variables re°ecting
factors that a®ect demand for tickets to college football games at institution i that also vary over
the t seasons in the sample, Ct is a vector of factors that a®ect demand for tickets to college football
games in general and ® ¯, and Á are vectors of unknown parameters to be estimated. uit is an
independent and identically distributed mean zero, constant variance random error term that is
assumed to be uncorrelated with the other right hand side variables and captures the e®ects of
other omitted factors on demand for college football attendance. Table 8 describes the variables
included in the demand function.
Note that we do not include a ticket price variable in the demand function. Instead, we use
implicit variables to capture the e®ect of ticket prices on demand. These implicit variables are an
institution-speci¯c intercept and an institution-speci¯c time trend. We also include the Entertain-
ment component of the Consumer Price Index relative to the total CPI in the empirical demand
function. This variable should capture general changes in the price of leisure activities over the
sample.
Table 8: Variables in Demand Function
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation
Wi;t¡1 Total wins by team i in season t ¡ 1 5.5 2.6
ENRi;t Headcount enrollment at institution i in year t 19.4 11.2
CAPi;t Stadium capacity at institution i in fall of year t 44359 22318
HGi;t Number of home games played by team i in season t 5.6 0.95
NTVi;t National TV appearances by team i in season t .70 1.3
RTVi;t Regional TV appearances by team i in season t .87 1.2
Pt Entertainment component of CPI relative to total CPI 101.8 6.7
There are three problems with including an own-price variable in the demand function. First,
no comprehensive source of ticket prices by team for our sample period exists. Kaempfer and Pacey
(1986) collected average price data for a football ticket for 72 Division I-A and I-AA teams over the
period 1978-1981; Fizel and Bennett (1989) collected average price data for a football ticket for 93
Division I-A teams for 1980-1985; Carroll (1991) collected average price data for a football ticket
for 30 Division I-A teams for 1979-1990. However, these studies did not include the same subset of
teams.
Second, a single average ticket price to a college football game for a given school may be
di±cult to measure correctly, and may not re°ect the actual cost of attending a game. Athletic
18departments are price discriminating monopolists. They charge di®erent prices to many di®erent
groups of consumers. Students typically pay an athletic fee that covers admission to football and
basketball games whether or not the student attends. Prime seats, and in some cases nearly all
seats in a stadium, can often only be purchased after a large donation to the athletic department or
an associated athletic booster's club, and most of these can only be purchased as part of a season
ticket package. Local businesses who donate to the athletic department may be given tickets to
distribute to customers. The visiting team is typically provided with several thousand tickets to
each game to sell. And seats in the end zone or far reaches of the stadium often have a di®erent price
than seats in other locations. All these factors make the construction of an appropriate \average"
ticket price a di±cult proposition.
Finally, there appears to be a relationship between the ticket price variable and stadium capacity
in the existing literature. Both Kaempfer and Pacey (1986) and Fizel and Bennett (1989) have
to interact their price variables with a percent of capacity variable to get the point estimate of
the coe±cient on price to have the predicted sign. These transformations suggest that the price
variable may not be measured well.
The empirical demand function also includes conference dummy variables and an overall time
trend common to all schools in the sample. The results of estimating Equation 11 are shown on
Table 9. The parameters on the conference dummies, school dummies, and school-speci¯c time
trends are not shown. Almost all were statistically signi¯cant.
Table 9: OLS Estimates of Attendance Demand Function
ATTi;t = ®Zi + ¯Xit + ÁCt + uit
Variable Overall Power Non-Power
HGi;t 29969* 51195* 24680*
(1166) (2918) (1220)
Pt -.797* -1.005 -.861*
(0.259) (0.684) (0.267)
Wi;t¡1 2106* 3120* 1742*
(396) (1162) (405)
ENRi;t 2662* 295 3195*
(913) (2513) (935)
Post-1984 -3076 -208 -3476
(2850) (7695) (2935)
CAPi;t .714* 2.39* .710*
(0.188) (0.905) (0.181)
Trend 9832* 2869 9986*
(2673) (3557) (2508)
NTVi;t 3746* 1018 5504*
(969) (1687) (1206)
RTVi;t 1741** 1540 2113**
(835) (1839) (911)
N 1622 288 1334
R
2 0.61 0.42 0.42
Standard Errors in Parentheses
*: Signi¯cant at 1% level
**: Signi¯cant at 5% level
The results on Table 9 are in general correctly signed and plausible. The ¯rst column is for
the entire sample. Home games, wins in the previous season, and headcount enrollment all raise
19attendance. Televison appearances also raise attendance at games, suggesting that telecasts and
attendance are complements, and not substitutes as the NCAA argued, and further implying that
the NCAA's regulation of telecasts was reducing attendance at games and also revenues earned
by college football programs. The parameter on the price of entertainment suggests that as the
price of entertainment rose relative to the CPI, consumers purchased less entertainment, including
tickets to college football games. The parameter on the post-1984 dummy variable is negative but
it is not statistically signi¯cant. The overall increase in the number of college football broadcasts
did not appear to a®ect attendance.
Many previous studies have split the sample of institutions when analyzing the impact of the
1984 Supreme Court decision on attendance, because the decision may have had a di®erential
impact on schools. The two rightmost rows on Table 9 split the sample into \Power" schools and
\Non-Power" schools. Past studies have split the sample by arbitrary groups of conferences and
non-conference schools. We split the sample by the number of national telecasts in the pre-1984
period. Our group of power teams were the roughly 20 teams that appeared on national television
four or more times from 1978-1983. However, splitting the sample by conference groups, or including
teams with three or more national television appearances, had no impact on the results.
There are signi¯cant di®erences in the estimates from the two subsamples, but the important
point is that the post-1984 dummy variable is not signi¯cant for either. The p-value on this
parameter for the \Non-Power" schools is about .2, so there is some weak evidence that attendance
was lower at these schools after 1984. The key di®erences are that the relative price of leisure,
television appearances, and headcount enrollment have no e®ect on attendance at the \Power"
schools. These colleges, listed in the appendix, have national reputations and draw customers to
their games from outside their students and alumni, to the extent that the enrollment variable also
re°ects relative di®erences in the number of alumni. The increase in attendance from each home
game is also much larger for these teams, as is the e®ect of stadium size.
Revenues
An examination of changes in revenues earned by Division I football programs before and after
the 1984 Supreme Court decision can also shed some light on the nature of this regulatory change.
Unfortunately, very little school-speci¯c data on revenues by athletic program exist for the period
1978-1990, precluding an econometric analysis of changes in revenues like the proceeding analysis
of changes in telecasts, attendance and winning percentages. Some aggregated data on revenues
generated by speci¯c athletic programs are available for the sample period. The most prominent
source of data on intercollegiate athletic revenues for the 1970s and 1980s is the report by Raiborn
(1990), who surveyed the ¯nancial condition of athletic programs at a large number of colleges and
universities. This study does not report school-speci¯c data, but contains some data on revenues
aggregated to the division level from the 1980s. Unfortunately, the aggregation scheme used in the
1970s does not correspond to that used in the 1980s and beyond, making a comparison of revenue
data across these decades di±cult.
If the 1984 Supreme Court decision on telecast deregulation reduced revenues earned by Division
I schools, then the cartel model would be supported as theory clearly predicts lower revenues after
the breakup of a cartel. However, little change or an in crease in revenues in the period after
1984 would indicate that some other model of economic behavior might apply to the relationship
between the NCAA and its member institutions.
Table 10 summarizes the data on revenues earned by Division I football programs in Raiborn
(1990). The nominal revenue data reported in this survey were converted to 1985 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index. From Table 10, average revenues rose considerably from 1981 to 1985 in
20Table 10: Revenues of Division I Football Programs
1981 1985 1989
Average Football Revenues $ 3,169,000 $ 3,735,000 $ 3,776,000
% Change from previous period 18% 1%
Largest Reported Value $ 7,875,000 $ 10,700,000 $ 14,931,000
% Change from previous period 36% 21 %
Revenues in real 1985 dollars.
in°ated adjusted terms but the increase from 1985 to 1989 was not so large. The largest reported
revenue in Raiborn's sample also shows a similar pattern. Because the deregulation occurred
between 1981 and 1985, the observed changes in revenue from 1981 to 1985 can only be partially
attributed to the regulatory change. We do not have adequate revenue data to investigate a cleaner
split in the change in revenues before and after the Supreme Court decision. The post-regulatory
increase in aggregate revenues suggests, however, that overall, member colleges and universities
were better o® following the decision. This could be interpreted as an indication of imperfect
agency behavior by the NCAA central organization prior to the decision.
4 Conclusions
The principal-agent model of the relationship between member teams and the NCAA central organi-
zation provides an alternative and complement to the cartel model as a rationale for the regulatory
activities of the NCAA. In general, our model and empirical results are not inconsistent with the
cartel model of the NCAA. Imperfect agency behavior could serve to exacerbate the impact of an ef-
fective cartel. As an imperfect agent, the NCAA central organization would result in over-regulation
relative to a cartel outcome that would be optimal for the team principals. The implication of this
model is that the NCAA was able to divert bene¯ts from the member team principals to the NCAA
central organization to promote its own interests, such as power and authority.
Our empirical analysis of the 1984 Supreme Court decision that deregulated intercollegiate
football telecasts by reassigning property rights to this activity from the NCAA to the individual
teams generally supports the prediction of imperfect agency behavior by the NCAA. The position
of the NCAA in that suit was that its regulation of football telecasts was in the interest of the
member teams by protecting live game attendance and competitive balance through limiting the
total number of games that could be telecast and the number of appearances of any particular team.
Our analysis of television appearances shows that not only did these increase in total at the national
broadcast level, but the characteristics of the individual teams whose games were likely to be telecast
changed following the deregulation. Both of these e®ects support the prediction of imperfect agency
behavior by the NCAA. Our ¯ndings on competitive balance before and after the Supreme Court
decision are mixed. As measured by average margin of victory, competitive balance was reduced
following the decision, which does not support the prediction of imperfect agency behavior. As
measured by winning percentage, there was no signi¯cant change in competitive balance across the
division, which supports the prediction of imperfect agency behavior. Our analysis of attendance
before and after the Supreme Court decision indicates that NCAA regulation did not have any
signi¯cant e®ect on either of these, supporting the prediction of imperfect agency behavior by the
NCAA.
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